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IN the address which in accordance with custom it will
be my duty to submit to you to-night I purpose saying some-
thing concerning the neural processes underlying two en-
dowments which are to be found at the root of all our
mental and bodily activities. They are endowments natur-
ally obscure and difficult to understand, concerning which
great differences of opinion exist both among psychologists
and neurologists. I allude to the processes of Attention and
Volition. It is still not uncommon for them to be regarded
as separate and mysterious ' faculties,' in the old sense, and
to find those who hold such views Beeking, in the same
spirit, to enthrone them in some definite centres in the
cerebral cortex. It is the process of attention more especially
that has given rise to an enormous amount of discussion
during the last quarter-of-a-century. Previous to this period
no very great diversity of opinion existed in regard to this
mental endowment, or as to the complicacy of the processes
with which i{ is associated; but the promulgation of the
doctrines of Wundt and Bain in regard to ' feelings of effort'
as concomitants of the activity of motor centres or of the
outgoing current, followed as it was soon afterwards by the
1
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2 ON THE NBUBAIi PBOCES8ES
postulation and supposed location of true ' motor centres ' in
the cerebral cortex, speedily led to the enunciation of many
new views concerning attention, perception, volition and
other psychical processes. The brilliancy and importance of
the experiments which led to the discovery of the centres in
question, combined with the popular view of their interpreta-
tion, undoubtedly tended to foster the spread of the parent
doctrines.
Now, however, when the fundamental doctrines of
Wundt and Bain in regard to the nature and origin of the
feelings of effort are believed by many to be absolutely dis-
proved ;x and when the derivative notion that ' motor cen-
tres ' exist in the cerebral cortex has also, in the opinion of
many, been shown to be almost similarly improbable, it
seems an opportune moment to look beyond, and enquire as
to the validity of the foundations for some of the new doc-
trines concerning attention and volition, which are also to be
regarded as, in great part, derivatives of the fundamental
notions above referred to.
It is clear that the two processes of attention and volition,
have so much in common that there must be a certain
community of interpretation both from the psychological and
from the neurological point of view. It is not likely, that is,
that one process could be explained correctly from the old
and the other from the newer point of view. If these newer
views are untenable in the one case, they will be similarly
unfit for the explanation of the related psychical process.
Let us first then, as a point of departure, look briefly at
the old notions concerning the nature of attention and vo-
lition, so far as these were defined by British philosophers
up to about the year 1840.
Both Beid and Dugald Stewart speak of attention as
though it were an almost purely ' active' process, but James
"M"ill, in his "Analysis of the Phenomena df the Human
Mind," regards it rather as a two-sided process, as being
both active and passive. Thus, he says,3 " the other process
1
 Of Wundt only as regards his supposed 'feelings of innervation'; as he
admits that one part of the feeling of enort is of afferent origin.—" Psyoholpgie
PhyBiologique." 1886, t. I., pp. 431 & 446.
• 1829, Vol. H., p. 29a







UNDERLYING ATTENTION AND VOLITION. 3
-through which the mind is supposed to influence its trains,
is Attention. We seem to have the power of attending or
.not attending to any object; by which is meant that we can
will to attend to it, or not to attend.' But on the following
page he says—" The state of mind under a pleasurable or
painful sensation is such, that we say, the sensation en-
grosses the mind . . . . The phrase engrossing the mind is
sometimes exchanged for the word attention. A pleasurable
or painful sensation is said to fix the attention of the mind.
But if any man tries to satisfy himself what it is to have a
painful sensation, and what it is to attend to it, he will find
little means of distinguishing them. Having a pleasurable
or painful sensation, and attending to it, seem not to be two
things, but one and the same thing . . . . The feeling ie
not one thing, the attention another; the feeling and the at
tention are one and the same thing." Similarly, in regard
to other modes of attention, Mill held that, " as in the case
of sensation, attending to an interesting idea is merely having
it ; attention to an indifferent idea is merely associating it
with some idea that is interesting." These extracts suffice
to show that for James Mill the process of attention was an
ebsenuittily jjtwoivo u^o, o^lthat its apparently active element
was only due to the superaddition of Will or Volition.
The view of Sir William Hamilton concerning attention
"was very similar. That attention is in ite essence more of a
passive than of an active process is evidently Hamilton's view,
since he says:1—"I think Reid and Stewart incorrect in as-
serting that attention is only a voluntary act, meaning by the
expression voluntary an act of free-will . . . . It therefore,
appears to me the more correct doctrine to hold that there is
no consciousness without attention,—without concentration,
but that attention is of three degrees or kinds. The first, a
mere vital and irresistible act; the second, an act determined
by desire, which, though involuntary, may be resisted by our
"will; the third, an act determined by a deliberate"volition.
An act of attention—that is an act of concentration—seems
thus necessary to every exertion of consciousness." And
previously (p. 237) he had written:—" Attention is conscioue-
1
 "Lectures on Metaphysics," (DellvcL 1886-87) Vol. L, p. 347.







4 ON THE NEUHAIi PBOCESSE3
ness and something more. It is consciousness voluntarily
applied, under its law of limitations, to Borne determinate
object; it is consciousness concentrated."
The views commonly held in regard to Volition up to.
the early part of this century were not appreciably different
from those put forward by Locke at a much earlier period,
who, in the simple language of his time said :'—" We find in
ourselves a Power to begin or to forbear, continue or end
the several Actions of our Minds and Motions of our Bodies,
barely by a thought or preference of the Mind." No details,
however, were offered by him as to the mode in which
' will' was capable of influencing either the actions of our
minds or the motions of our bodies. For the first valuable
hint as to the details of the latter process we have, indeed,
to turn to James Mill, though Hartley had made an attempt
in this direction when he said:'—" Of the two sorts of
motion, viz., Automatic and Voluntary, the first depends upon
Sensation, the last upon Ideas." James Mill's contribution
to our knowledge of the subject was, however, much more
important. As others had done, he called attention to the.
fact that a feeling of an emotional order, known as ' desire,'
was a necessary prelude to a voluntary movement, but that
something else accompanies or immediately follows this
emotion of desire—viz., an Idea or Conceptipn of the
kind of movement needed for its gratification. He says,1
" We do not undertake to say what physical links are
between the Idea and the Contraction, any more than
between the Sensation and the Contraction. The Idea is
the last part of the Mental operation." This idea of the
movement to be executed was declared by Mill to be two-
fold in its origin. In reference to this he said :—" There
are two ideas very different from one another, to both of
which we give the name ' idea of the action.' . . . One
is the outward appearance of the action, and is always a very
obvious idea." The other is a copy of certain internal sen-
sations, which a few pages previously he had spoken of
1
" Essay concerning Hainan Understanding," 1639, Bk. IL, Chap. 21, 5 5.
» " Observations on Man," 1748, Ohap. L, § 8.
* hoc. tit., VoL IL, p. 266.
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generally as " sensations accompanying the movement," and
which he also more specifically denned (loc. cit., p. 275)
when speaking of the terminal events of a movement as
" the contraction of the muscles, with the various sensations
which the action upon these organs, and the actions excited
in them imply." Of these internal sensations, he says,
" from the habit of not attending to them, we have lost the
power of attending." And then he adds, " this last (namely
the revival of such internal sensations) is by no means an
obvious idea. And the mind passes from it so quickly,
intent upon the action which is its result, that it is almost
always swallowed up in the mass of association. It consti-
tutes, in fact, one of the most remarkable instances of that
class of links in a chain, which, how important soever to the
existence of the chain, are passed over so rapidly, that the
existence of them is hardly ever recognized
This last Idea alone is that upon which the contraction is
consequent."
After this brief introduction we will now turn to some of
the more modern conceptions as to the nature of attention
and volition.
ON THE RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN ATTENTION AND
VOLITION.
Both attention and volition are in part feelings of a so-
called ' active' type; the exercise of each of them being
associated with a ' feeling of effort.' Attention is the more
primordial endowment; and volition is in part a development
therefrom, in which, however, the root process is easily
to be detected.
Attention may be directed to impressions made by things
without—that is to sensations; or to their revival in idea—
the latter mode of activity being known as ' reflection.'
Attention itself is commonly held to mean a " concentra-
tion of consciousness." The more our consciousness is
narrowed and focussed, as it were, upon some one object or
thought, the more developed is that state of mind known as
attention. On the other hand, the wider the area of con-
sciousness, at any given moment, (the larger the number of
VOL. xv. ^
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objects or ideas simultaneously present), the less vivid is our
state of consciousness, the less developed is that phase of
mind known as attention. This mode of activity is, how-
ever, named ' apperception ' by Wundt.1 The entry of an
object intd the field of vision he speaks of as perception;
but when it becomes the object looked at—the central point
—there is what he calls apperception, or, as others would
say, a process of attention.1 With this process, there is
always a particular feeling of effort associated. He agrees,
in fact, with Fechner in saying that there is always a feeling
of tension in the sensorial organs corresponding with an act
of external attention, while with an act of internal attention
(reflection) there is a similar feeling referred to the scalp,
especially in the occipital region.1
But attention varies in its degree of complexity; it is.
simple or ' spontaneous,' for instance, when we are exposed
to some very vivid or novel sensorial impression, or when
there is the memorial recall of some extremely painful or
pleasurable incident. Attention i9 usually rendered, under
such circumstances, as it were automatically and without,
effort—and, as Bibot insists, in response to some emotional
state-* On the other hand, attention may be initiated in a.
more complex manner, as in those cases where it seems to-
be indissolubly associated with an act of will or volition.
This is the higher phasis known as ' voluntary attention ' ;
it is the process by which we compel ourselves to observe*
certain external phenomena, not of absorbing interest in
themselves, but for some ulterior purpose; or in which we=
direct our thoughts upon a given subject with a view to-
develop our knowledge of its relations.
Voluntary attention appears to be a compound or fusion
of the two states, volition and attention. This seems all
the more clear when we remember the two spheres of will
1
 According to Prof. Gattell (Mind, vol. xili., p. 488) the word ' apper-
ception ' was introduced into philosophy by Leibnits to denote a spontaneous,
activity of the mind through which presentations are dearly distinguished.
The word was also made use of by Kant and by Herbart, previously to the.
time when Wundt assigned such a prominent place to it in his psychology.
' Psychology phytioiogique, 1886, t. IL, p. 881.
• SeealaoBlbot," The Psychology of Attention," Chicago, 1890, pp. 22,67-69.
4
 Loc. tit., pp. 13,16, and 83.







UNDERLYING ATTENTION AND VOLITION. 7
long ago indicated by Locke. The direction of our thoughts
is, in fact, as much a mode of volitional activity as is the
production or the control of movements in predetermined
modes. Nay, more, it happens that the psychical process
preceding the production of all voluntary actions whatsoever
differs little, if at all, in its essential characters from that
which is comprised in an act of voluntary attention
(Wundt). Anteriorly, however, there is in volition another
important process; there is more or less of a weighing of
motives prompting to this or that kind of action—that is, of
deliberation. This deliberation terminates in the domi-
nance of one or other of the motives under consideration, and
with this there is generally associated the idea of some action
to be performed now or at some future date. This domi-
nance, therefore, makes more vivid the idea of its particular
associated movement or series of movements. Coincidently,
if there is to be present action, there is the removal of all
4
 inhibition,' and the ideal movement becomes immediately
replaced by the actual movement which it prefigured. As to
this latter process Hume said :x—" But the means by which
thiB is effected; the energy by which the Will performs so
extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far from being
immediately conscious, that it must ever escape our dili-
gent enquiry." To this prognostication we may, I think,
fairly demur. Our knowledge of the functions of the
Bolandic area, and of its relations through the pyramidal
system of fibres with motor centres in the bulb and in the
eord, does, in part, redeem us from this reproach of hopeless
ignorance.
ATTENTION.
In reference to Attention three problems seem especially
worthy of consideration :— [1] as to the essential nature or
mode of production of the process of attention; [2] as to the
exact relation of attention to motor activity, and as to its
intensification or diminution thereby; [S] as to the cerebral
seat or mechanisms concerned with this endowment.
1
 " A Trettiae ot Hna»n Nature," 1787.







8 ON THE NEUBAIi PROCESSES
Under one or other of these heads most of the principal
difficulties or differences of opinion in regard to attention may
be discussed.
1. As to the Essential Nature of Attention.
How is it that the limitation in the area, or concentration
of consciousness, in which attention seems to consist, is
brought about? This is a very difficult problem if the
enquiry is confined to the essential neural process itself. In
seeking for light on this subject we should, therefore, face it
in its simplest form. What happens, for instance, in a case
of spontaneous attention to some novel visual impression,
when, with all other avenues of sense open, we seem to be
aware only of this particular visual impression—all other
modes of consciousness seeming to be for the time blotted
out ? I am not prepared with any new answer to this fun-
damental question, nor have I been able to find any definite
reply thereto in the writings of other neurologists or psy-
chologists.
Some such attempt, it is true, has been made by Maud-
sley. Speaking of the conditions of consciousness generally,
he says •}—" The persistence for a time of a certain
degree of intensity of energy in the. ideational circuit would
certainly appear to be the condition of consciousness ; " and
two pages further on he adds, "Attention is- the arrest of the
transformation of energy for a moment—the maintenance of
a particular tension." This, however inadequate, does afford
some sort of an explanation. It gives some account (a) of
the reason why a particular impression should in certain
cases become dominant, and also (6) why other impressions
should, for the time, be blotted out of consciousness.
As to the first point, we know (a) that the adequacy of a
given impression to become dominant and all-engrossing
depends greatly upon the individual's experiences and tastes,
and thus is dependent even more upon the previous activities
of other brain elements than upon those now being primarily
excited from without. For instance, the effects produced
by setting light to a long train of gunpowder would concen-
> " The Phyiiology of Mind," 1876, p. 806.
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trate the attention of a savage who had never previously seen
such a marvel, very much more than it would concentrate
the conciousness of one of ourselves. In the cortical cells
excited in us by the impressions derived from the explosion of
a train of gunpowder, the molecular activities aroused would.in
part, at once well out through a series of oommissural fibres to
other sensory centres, there to revive related past impressions,
so that we should immediately perceive or realize the nature of
the external cause. But in the savage, the experience being
a novel one, the molecular activity aroused could not at once
flow out through such commissural channels; these would
not exist; there might consequently be momentary tension in
the cells of the visual centres ; and (b) the superior intensity
of this process might therefore, by comparison, dim or blot
out other coexisting but weaker and more familiar impres-
sions—just as, to take a rough example, in coming from
bright sunlight into a darkened room we are at first unable
to discern anything. Similarly, a pain or a pleasure, but
especially the former, may concentrate our consciousness
so as to exclude all else, by its mere intensity.
In either of these cases, the novelty, the intensity, the
pain, or the pleasure associated with the external impres-
sions, cause them to engross our attention. It is given by no
effort of our own ; it is, as it were, commanded and no retds-
tance is offered.1
In the majority of cases, however, where attention comes
into play, it does so by virtue of some selective and controll-
ing process, which we ourselves initiate. It is started from
within, that is, rather than from without. Such processes
1
 Cyples ("The Progress of Human Intelligence," 1880, p. 188) says: "In
cases where Impression chiefly U acting (that is where reminiscence, ratiocin-
ation, Ac., are not playing much of a part), our attention is quite at the mercy
of vividness or intensity * * * * In looking at a soene in a merely general
way, anything moving attracts us—the flight of a bird, the flashing fall of a
cascade, the waving trees, will draw our regard from the still objects; but if
among these latter there be one showing colour, it might successfully oompete
with the things in motion. A shrill cry from another part of the scene might
cause us to turn the head wholly away. But if, when gazing at one thing
moving, another in the line of vision moved quicker, or if beside one patch of
colour another were to show of a fierier hue, shift the eye we must—that Is, if
we had not some motive to the contrary stirring a volition." This same
author makes a very elaborate but obscure attempt to explain the process of
Attention from a Neurological standpoint. Still his explanation contains
«ome valuable suggestions (foe. tit., pp. 123-161).
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are of Tarioua degrees of complexity. But, as Bibot says: r
—" In voluntary attention the aim is no longer set by hazard
or circumstance ; it is willed, chosen, accepted, or at least
submitted to ; it is mainly a question of adapting ourselves
to it, and of finding the proper means for maintaining the
state; hence voluntary attention is always accompanied by a
certain feeling of effort . . . . The birth of voluntary atten-
tion, the, power of fastening the mind upon non-attractive
otijects, can only be accomplished by force, under the in-
fluence of education . . . . It is an instrument that has been
perfected—a product of civilization . . . . Love of work is a
sentiment of purely secondary formation, that goes hand in
hand with civilization. And we may note, now, that work
is the concrete, the most manifest form of attention. Con-
tinuous work is repugnant even to half-civilized tribes."
All processes of 'voluntary attention' are, however, com-
plex phenomena which, as I venture to think, are com-
pounded of volition and attention. Some of the means by
which we turn our attention in this or that direction will be
referred to in the next section ; while others will be spoken of
when we treat of volition itself—which see.ms-to be the most
distinctive side of this complex process known as ' voluntary
attention.'
2.—As to the Relation of Attention to Motor Activity, and
its Intensification or Diminution thereby.
It is the faphion with some at the present day to speak
of attention as an essentially ' motor process.' This view,
however, does not seem to me a just one although, for rea-
sons to be stated, motor activity is inseparably bound up
with almost all processes of attention.1
1
 Loe. cit., pp. 85-48.1
 Ribot, toe. cit., pp. 8, 26, A 29. This author admits however, that there is
no decisive proof as between his view, and that whioh holds that motor phe-
nomena are simpljflnseparable elements in Attention-. Thus he says Uoc. cit.,
p. 60):—" But the reader will say:' We admit that there are motor elements
in perceptions, images, and, to a less degree, in oonoepts. Still, that does not
ntt«,hlt°h the fact that attention aots upon.them, and ttrough-them, and that
it la a motory mechanism.' True, upon this point we oan cite no observation
or experiment that would be decisive. The crucial test would oonsurt in dis-
oovertng whether a man, deprived of all external and internal motility—and
of that alone—would be still capable of attention. But thai experiment Is not
practicable." Sully, however, says (BB*»; 1890, p. 166):—"I think, if wo
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The cause of this inseparable relationship is, in the first
place, the fundamental one, that throughout the animal
world expression invariably follows impression ; or, in other
words, that by the very constitution of our nervous systems
impressions made from without upon nervous ganglion cells^
and the molecular motions there liberated, flow towards other
groups of ganglion cells, and thence outwards through nervous
channels, either diffusely or along definite routes. In this
way either generalized or more or less obviously special move-
ments in response are evoked.
In our waking state, when all our senses are to some
extent active, a diffuse and almost imperceptible wave of
molecular movement is ever welling out to the various
muscles of our body, so as to maintain in them the condition
known as ' tonus,' together with those persistent, more or
less slight, activities needed to maintain the necessary
equilibrium between opposing groups of muscles.1 But, let
our sensorial activity be cut off by the supervention of sleep,
and immediately there is a diminished reverberation of
external impressions through the nervous system ; and there
is consequently a diminution of this diffusive outgoing wave,
as is at once shown by the nodding head and relaxed limbs
of the sleeper.
But, if the states of consciousness which, as a whole, enter
into or compose our waking condition are attended by this
subdued and generalized outflow of molecular activity
making for the whole muscular system, there are also equally
fundamental reasons why special excitations of sensorial
activity should be associated with special muscular move-
ments—and that, too, as initiatory or accompanying rather
than as consecutive phenomena.
The conformation of the sense organs of animals as well
as their relation to the external stimuli by which they are
carefully examine oar state* of mind when we are attending to impressions or
ideas, we are in some oasee able to fHaHnyil.Tt attention as something apart
from and independent of muscular activity. That, as everybody knows, we
may fix the eye on an objeot and yet not attend to that object. Hehnholts
notices the fact that we can attend to an objeot in the side regions of the field
of vision without fixating the object. Where, one may aak, is the motor factor,
the process of muscular adjustment hi tM« oaso ?f'1
 See Bibot (las. dt.) p. 86 (2).
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excited makes this a necessity. Sounds may come to the ears
from all sides; so that movements of the body, of the head and
neck, or of the ears themselves are needed for their perfect
or better appreciation. The same holds good for visual
impressions and visual organs ; and how much the sense of
touch is heightened by movement is familiar to all. Taste
is also intensified by certain movements, and, though to a
still smaller extent, the sense of smell. Throughout the
whole n.m'n>ftl series, and as long as ftnimftTq have existed,
there must always have been this inseparable relation
between the several modes of sensorial activity and move-
ments. Such movements are, as we have seen, either more
or less permissive of the sensorial activity, as when the head
is turned in a particular direction; or they go to develop or
intensify the impressions that can be received, as when
movements of the eyes, ears, or hands take place with the
effect of vastly augmenting the range or the intensity of the
respective visual, auditory, or tactile impressions.1
What winder then that in association, for instance, with
visual or auditory impressions there should have grown up
an inseparable motor response of a more special kind, to wit,
a turning of the head and eyeB in the direction of the sight
or sound, together with a fixed attitude of the body
generally.
That there should be an ' attitude of attention' is, as we
see, perfectly natural; just as it is perfectly natural that
with different emotions there should be different special
1
' Adjustment of attention' to ita objeots is commonly spoken of as
though it were a motor process. Wundt does so, for instance, because
of the existence of sensations of tension referred to the corresponding
sense organs. In ' pro-attention ' or ' expectant attention,' snch sensations
may, it is true, come from merely permissive muscular actions in the sense
organs. Bnt if reaction time is diminished when the nature of the impression
is mown beforehand, and still further when the time of its occurrence is also
known; such adjustment is sorely in great part sensory and dependent upon
the fact that an image or idea of the event foreseen is evoked, and evoked at
exactly the right time, so that, as Bibot says (loe. cxi. p. 74), "the real event
is but the re-inforoement of the representation already existing." The sup-
position made by Bain and others that mere ideal recal of perceptions involves
a feeling of tension in the corresponding sense organ is very questionably
true. Such feelings of tension or effort (in accordance with the view that
they are of afferent origin) would require dlstinot contractions of muscles for
their generation. But obvious contractions of muscles are mostly absent in
inch cases. And no one has peripherally initiated feelings of effort from
mere "nascent" excitations oi muscles, stopping short of producing actual
contractions.







ATTENTION AND VOLITION. 1 3
motor accompaniments. But because of these inseparable
motor accompaniments, it seems to me we might almost as
reasonably say that emotion is an essentially mdtor process
as make such an affirmation concerning attention.
Each of these mental processes is, I believe, especially
concerned, in different modes, with the activity of sensory
elements, although a special welling over of molecular
activity into related motor mechanisms is also almost
inseparable from the activity of each of them. In other
words, we have to do both in emotion and in attention with
sensori-motor processes, though, in my opinion, the gan-
glionic elements concerned with the motor side of this
activity lie altogether outside the cerebral hemispheres, just
as the activity of such motor mechanisms lies altogether
outside the sphere of consciousness.1
The question of the direction of attention, or the degree
to which it may be intensified or diminished is one which
really pertains to the subject of volition, as it only comes
1
 Thus, to Bay, as Prof. James does (" Prinoip. of Psychol.," 1890, vol. i.,
p. 80):—" Ideas of sensation, ideas of motion are, on the other hand, the
elementary factors oat of which the mind is built up," is quite in accord-
ance with my own beliefs. We have in the cerebral cortex an extended
register of two kinds of sensory impressions—those which primarily incite to
movement together with other sensory impressions (kdnsesthetio) resulting
from such movements and constituting the subsequent guides for the
execution of similar movements. Just as the different kinds of sensory
centres belonging to the first set are brought into intimate relation with one
another by means of oommissural fibres, so are the kiiUBsthetic oentres,
similarly connected with each of the other sensory registers. The statement
quoted above is, however, quite a different thing from saying as Hughlings
Jackson (" Olin. and PhyB. Besearohes on the Nervous System," 1876,
pp. xx-xxxvii.) has done with much inslstance that " mental operations in
the last analysis must be merely the subjective side of sensory and motor
substrata "; or from saying as Ribot (" Les mouv. et leur import, psyohol."
in Remit philotophique, Deo., 1879) does that we have such things as " motor
ideas," that " movement and sensation are the stuff of which our mental life
is oomposed," or that "at the root of our mpTitn.1 life, everywhere and always
there are movements." I should agree to the last proposition if " ideas of
movement" were substituted for "movements." All the other modes of
expression imply that there are motor centres in the cortex, and that the
activity of motor oentres carries with it a subjective phasis, both of which
positions I, in common with James, Mfinsterberg and others, believe to be
erroneous. The " idea of the movement," apart from its visual component, is
an image of a body of ingoing impressions caused by the movement itself, and
the registering oentre for these impressions has precisely the same claim as
the visual and the auditory to be regarded as a sensory oentre. This is the-
view also now held by Ribot, though formerly, as we have seen, he used,
language seeming to imply that ideas of movement are revived in motor
centres ("Fsyohol. of Attention," p. 64). TTiq real view is explicitely stated-,
however, on pp. 26, 27, 66 and 67.
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into play when 'voluntary attention' is being exercised.
This sabject will, therefore, be referred to when I speak of
the mode by which our thoughts are controlled or concen-
trated in this or that direction.
8. As to the Cerebral Seat or Nervous Mechanisms concerned
with Attention.
In his recent very interesting paper, read before this
Society, on " The Psychophysical Process in Attention,"
Sully days : " In England as well as in Germany the ques-
tion of the precise region of the cortex involved in the
process of attention has been the subject of considerable
discussion."1 It is well known, also, that Ferrier localises
the " faculty of attention " in the frontal lobes. His most
recent statement on the subject is this. Speaking of the
effects caused by removal of the frontal lobes, he says :' " I
have also observed (and my observations have been confirmed
by Hitzigand Goltz) a noteworthy psychical defect—a defect
which I have endeavoured to correlate with the inability to
look at, or direct the gaze towards, objects which do not
spontaneously fall within the field of vision. It is a form of
mental degradation which appears to me to depend on the
loss of the faculty of attention, and my hypothesis is that
the power of attention is intimately related to the volitional
movements of the head and eyes." This latter view Ferrier
r, 1890, p. 147. Sully, in fact, seems to suppose that we have to
look in the TniHn for some " higher motor centre "as being specially concerned
with the process of attention. He says elsewhere (" Outlines of Psychology,"
p. 77): "The fact that attention is an act of tha mind would suggest that its
nervous concomitants are certain processes in those nerve centres which we
know to be more especially oonoemed with movement and action. This con-jecture is borne out by the fact that the act of attention is commonly accom-
panied by muscular contractions"—referring here to the movements of the
bead ana eyes and the attitude of the body generally during aots of attention.
Again, further on, he says (loc ciL p. 661): " In the oontrol of movement
and of feeling, nervous M M I ™ appears to pass from.the higher motor oentees(including those of attention) to the lower motor centres from which this
process oil innervation concerned in the impulsive or emotional movement
sets out." Still Sully has since contended (BBAH, 1890, p. 157) that atten-
tion " cannot wholly be resolved into a motor phenomenon. He adds:
" The relation of the two is, I suspect, very *<™'W to that which obtains
between an emotion and the several sensory and motor phenomena which.
sooempaByit." This lattar conclusion may be admitted as correct; bat the
holding of such a view is surely not in accordance with the language pse-
fol tedy
' " Cerebral Localisation," 1890, p. 16L
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puts elsewhere in the following words :*—" The faculty of
Attention with all that it implies in the sphere of intellectual
operations, must be intimately related to the volitional con-
trol of the head and eyes in association with the centres of
visual perception and ideation."
No attempts at the localisation of attention are made by
.Bain. He, in fact, gives no details concerning attention,
•or as to the way in which it is brought about.
Wundt, however, does postulate a distinct organ for
apperception (attention) which he also is inclined to localise
in the convolutions of the frontal lobe.8 But it should be
said that his theories concerning apperception, its localisa-
tion, and the modes of cerebral activity with which it is
associated are entirely speculative and fanciful.* He postu-
lates the existence of this centre of apperception, to which,
as he imagines, all sensory impressions are sent in duplicate
(by way of the cerebellum), and from which again he postu-
lates the issue of one set of fibres to each of the cortical
sensory centres, together with another set to each of the
supposed motor centres of the cortex. "What happens when
attention is aroused by some external object is, according to
Wundt, as follows :*—The first effect is the production of an
image of an intuitive or imaginary order, not sharply denned,
but as it would be if much to the side of a visual field.
This, Wundt regards as the result of the stimulus upon the
cortical visual centres, but he adds : " The sensorial irrita-
tion is at the same time transmitted to the central territory
of apperception. Thence the stimulus follows a double
route and directs itself (1) backwards towards the sensory
territory with the effect of reinforcing the image; and (2)
towards the motor centres which innervate the voluntary
muscles, as a result of which there -are necessarily produced
those muscular tensions that assist to constitute the feelings
of effort accompanying attention, and which react in their
turn upon attention—reinforcing it in conformity with the
1
 " Functions of the Brain," 2nd Ed., 1886, p. 284.1
 hoc. dt. 11., p. 246, and fig. 65.
' See art. by Bain In Mind, 1887, pp. 174-8.
* hoe. tit. i. IL, p. 236.
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law that associated feelings lend one another a mutual
support."
With most of these statements and points of view I have
myself no sympathy. As will have been seen, I take a
totally different view as to the relations of the centres con-
cerned with the turning of the head and eyes to the process
of attention from that adopted by Ferrier, nor can I regard
attention, whether called by its own name or by that of
' apperception,' as a ' faculty' which, somewhat in the old
phrenological sense, is to be definitely localised in this or
that portion of the cortex; and least of all could I think, if it
is to be topographically localised, that we should place this
essentially sensorial endowment in that region of the brain
which may, truly enough, be concerned with the production
of one of its commonest motor accompaniments or reactions.
The reason why there must necessarily be such motor re-
actions and accompaniments is, as I have said, dependent
in part upon the constitution of our nervous systems, and in
part upon the fact that we are compelled to react by turning
the head and eyes in this or that direction, because from all
sides visual and auditory stimuli may come to us. The re-
lation between these particular movements of the head and
eyes and attention do not, therefore, convince me that they
are other than almost necessary results of senflorial activity.
On the other hand, I should not think of attempting to localise
the process known aB attention in any one definite part of the
brain, but should regard it as having its loci in cell and fibre
mechanisms in each one of the cortical sensorial centres—
that is, as being concerned with mechanisms scattered all
over the cortex, according as we are, with more or less pre-
dominance, attentive to visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory,
gustatory, or kineesthetic impressions.
VOLITION.
As already intimated the sphere of what is called Volition
is commonly believed to be two-fold. Thus, one form of
such activity is supposed to exist which manifests itself in the
control or guidance of our thoughts; and another in the pro-
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duction of muscolar movements. These two processes
correspond with what Wundt terms the " internal and the
external activity " of Will. What really happens in these two
cases we must now consider.
In the first place it is necessary, here also, to get rid of
the erroneous notion that under the head of Will or Volition
there is to be included a distinct ' faculty' having a cerebral
localisation of its own in some part of the cortex—an
imaginary ' faculty' acting as a well-spring of power, isolated
and mysterious in its origin. Still less can we believe that
Will is " a species of spiritual rudder distinct from and
superior to the automatic forces of the brain."1
According to Bain the external and the internal modes of
activity of will are essentially similar ; he holds that in each
case the fundamental action is through motor centres and
muscles, and his view has been adopted by Bibot and
others.3
Bain says :*—" I look upon volition as existing only in
connection with the active organs, that is, with the-muscular
system. Even in the sphere of thought the limitation
holds." For Wundt, James and others, also, any difference
that might be thought to exist between the two processes is
more apparent than real. They, however, differing from
Bain, regard as fundamental the nervous processes that
occur anterior to the actual incitation to the movement—
holding, as they do, that the activity of muscle is a non-
essential and mere physical addendum to the volition itself.
As Wundt points out, in certain cases of paralysis the will to
move may be there and made—even though the movement
does not follow.4
1
 The Spectator, June 6th, 1891, p. 798.
• Loc. at., p. 61.
• " The Senses and the Intelleot," 8rd Ed., p. 669.
4
 As to the psychological characteristics of the two modes of volitional
activity (internal and external) Wundt (loc. tit. t. II., p. 446) contends that
there is a feeling of internal activity or effort associated with each of them,
bat in cases of the latter type where movements follow, he says, " this feeling
receives here a characteristic colouration because it becomes f used with the
sensations of the movement itself, so as to constitute an inseparable com-
plexus." The birth of this fusion becomes, therefore, for Wundt the
fundamental basis by which ' external voluntary activity ' is to be distinguished
psychologically from 'internal voluntary activity.'
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The Nature and Extent of Voluntary Power over the Control
and Direction of our Thoughts.
That we have some power of controlling or directing the
succession of our thoughts is generally recognised, and con-
firmed by the consciousness of each one of us. It seems
obvious, also, that this aptitude may not only be improved
by practice, but that it is naturally much better developed in
some persons than in others—and especially in those whose
powers of attention are strong.
In all such processes of direction or control of thought we
have the manifestation of the highest phase of attention—
that known as ' voluntary attention'—the consideration of
which was previously postponed till the present stage of our
enquiry was reached ; BQ that what is now to be said will
bear as much upon the subject of voluntary attention as
upon volition proper.1
I must take it as commonly admitted that the succession
of our thoughts depends upon what is known as the ' associa-
tion of ideas ' ; and that' these associations are but reflexes of
the sequences and coexistences obtaining among the various
sensorial impressions to which we are and have been from
moment to moment exposed throughout our Whole lives.
Thus the mind of man is, as Leibnitz called it, a ' mirror
of the world,' so far as it is revealed to each one of us.
Again, it is well understood that for the purpose of in-
fluencing or altering trains of association, the power of direct
impressions is more potent than that of mere remembered,
impressions: Consequently, when we are in the midst of a
train of abstract thought, any vivid impression coming to us
1
 What is now to be said may constitute an answer, in fact, to those who
still believe in the spiritual conception of Will. Thus a writer in The
Spectator (June 6, 1801, p. 789) has recently said that "voluntary or
scientific attention " is, " an act of pure will, meaning by will, of course,
not that which is the resultant of pre-exUtent impulses and desires, bnt that
self-caused effort by which scientific attention is distinguished from all such
acts of involuntary attention . . . . We know nothing if we do not know that
we ourselves cause for ourselves all snch acts of attention, and that science
of all kinds is the organised result of such acts . . . . As we said last week,
' will' is a word of supererogation, it is a will-o'-the-wisp which has no pre-
tence for existing at aU, if it represents nothing but a resultant of desires."
Yet that this latter view is true, we shall now endeavour to show. ,
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from without will tend to arouse associations of its own, and
thus disturb our previous trains of mere reminiscence.
If the subject on which we are thinking is associated with
external observation, the one or two senses concerned are of
course active and receptive, and the vivid impressions that
we receive through them suffice to fix our attention and
control our thinking processes. If we wish to divert our
attention from either of these vivid sensations, so as to be
enabled to follow some other line of thought we can avert
our eyes, or close our ears, so as to cut off the disturbing
impressions. In abstract thought we often naturally close our
eyes, court silence, and keep perfectly still, so as to have no
externally derived impressions of any kind disturbing our
trains of association.
We are concerned in all such cases with mere reminis-
cence or,memorial recall of past impressions, together with
intellectual activities related thereto. During such a process
portions of almost the whole of the cortex may be main-
tained in a condition of full or sub-conscious activity as,
with " the rapidity of thought," molecular notions pass along
countless definite lines or associating channels between this
and that group of ganglion cells. The nervous activity
tends in each case to pass most and with greatest ease along
those channels which have hitherto been most frequently
traversed—taking the routes, that is, which custom has
rendered " lines of least resistance." As an able writer
says : " In this way trains of thought of any length may be
«xcited ; until the original nervous activity either emerges
by some form of expression into the outer world, or becomes
absorbed in the stronger current of a fresh direct sensa-
tion."1
Thus it is found that our thoughts invariably follow one
another by the laws of habit or association (these being, as
I have said, a reflex of external co-existences and sequences),
the most vivid sensation or idea for the time being ever
filling our consciousness and rousing, through associational
channels, related ideas and concepts. So that the continuance
for a time of any one of them merely proves that during tho-
1
 B*rret, "Physical Ethics," 1869, p. 816.
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period of such continuance there is no other strong enough
to drive it out.
If, therefore, our thoughts succeed one another in this
way according to definite laws, it may be asked (a) what is
the province of volition or will in regard to their direction,
and (b) by what means can any such influence be exerted ?
(a) As to the first question I believe nothing more definite
than what Barret expresses in the following passage can be
said i1 " We may, indeed, if we like, give to those sequences
in which one train of thought supersedes another the name
of ' will,' as distinguished from those which are regular
members of one continued train; but their nature and
foundation must be the same in the one case as in the other;
for the second train must have some origin like the first, and
can only conquer by its superior force." It comes, in fact,
to this, that our thoughts invariably occur in accordance
with the ' laws of association'; but that in some cases,
changes in their order, or a persistence in the same order, is
said to be a result of ' will.' It is well known that Wundt
and others assert the need of something beyond the mere
association of ideas as being required for a scientific under-
standing of the so-called ' active ' powers of mind, and that
it was with this end in view that he postulated the existence
of his so-called faculty of apperception, carrying with it
activities of its own apart from the ordinary laws of the
' association of ideas.' Miinsterberg has of late conducted
two most important and skilful experimental investigations
bearing upon the question of the existence or not of any
such need. After a careful analysis of these researches
Croom Robertson sums up the impressions they have pro-
duced in the following manner :* " Taken together the two
researches in their different way certainly point to one con-
clusion—that there is no such difference between so-called
voluntary and involuntary intellection as Wundt's apper-
ception theory (or any other like it) would make out."
(b) It remains then to consider how this superseding of
one train by another, or continuance of an old train in spite.
1
 hoc. di.,v. 142.
* Mind, 1890, p. 242. P. H. Bradley also expresses strong opposition to.
"Wundt'a doctrine of apperception (see Mind, 1887, p. 366).
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of a tendency to wander, is or can be brought about; in
order to indicate the kind of means by •which what is called
' will' acts in directing or controlling the course of our
thoughts. On this subject a few hints only can be given,
concerning the different methods known to be adequate for
the attainment of such ends.
(1) In the first place it should be stated that there is a
sort of antagonism between the mental activity of mere
reminiscence, and that which is set on foot or maintained
by external impressions—for the reason that the same central
elements are called into activity in the two cases. Conse-
quently, when any very interesting train of thought is being
carried out we may become for the time ' self-absorbed,'
and, during this period, much less receptive of external
impressions, so long as they are not very intense. More-
over, when so engaged we always try to guard ourselves
from the possible disturbing influence of external impressions
of all kinds.
(2) Of the two opposing processes that which iB extern-
ally derived (impressional activity) is decidedly more vivid
and potent than that which is internally initiated (reflective
activity) ; and it is this fact that enables us at any time
(a) to interrupt and supersede a train of thought proceeding
in accordance with the laws of association; or, on the other
hand (/9) to maintain it when we so desire.
In the one case, in order (a) to break in upon a train of
association we may call into action some vivid sensorial
impression, and we may repeat this operation till we have
finally displaced the old train of thought—often simultane-
ously seeking the aid of bodily movements of one or other
kind, which are potent in this direction by reason of the
kinsesthetic impressions that ensue, and the new trains of
association that may be initiated thereby.
While, in the other case, where (/9) we seek to maintain
some train of thought in spite of a tendency to wander to
other subjects, we call in the aid of language. That is, we
repeat to ourselves some words essentially related to the sub-
ject of our thoughts, or we may sum up the stage at which
•we have arrived in words, thereby reinforcing the existing
VOL. xv. 3
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assoeiafcional activity to which our attention is being given,,
through the mixed auditory and kmssthetic impressions,
produced. How very influential this mode of control is
may be gathered from the added power of this kind that
we obtain when we call into play the aid of writing, and
thus help to maintain desired trains of reminiscence by
means of additional reinforcing sense impressions, of the
visual and kinasthetic order. Most of us must be familar
with the much greater ease with which we keep our thoughts,
along certain lines, and even develop them, when we are com-
mitting them to writing, as compared with what happens,
when we do not call into play this extra aid.
Thus, whether we seek to alter, ;or to maintain and
develop, any particular line of thought, we call up as many
new impressions as possible—of unlike kind when we wish
to disturb or break in upon a previous line of reminiscence ;
but of like or of related kind where we desire to strengthen
and develop the previous associations upon which we have-
been intent.
What has been said above might seem at first sight to
lend support to the views expressed by Bain,1 that " in all
voluntary control of the thinking trains there is a muscular
intervention" of a direct kind, so that, as he contends' " the
retention of an idea in the mind is operated by voluntary
muscles." This, however, cannot be admitted Will oper-
ates, aa we have seen, through the muscles only in an indirect
way—that is, the muscular actions to which we resort give
rise to ingoing impressions, and it is these which, according
to their nature, may break up or may reinforce pre-existing
trains of association. That is, there is a superseding or a.
strengthening of previous lines of thought, but in either case
the effect still occurs in strict accordance with the laws of
association.
It is perfectly true, therefore, that the excitation of mus-
cles (more especially those of our sense organs or those con-
cerned with speech) is an essential preliminary to the
guidance or control of our thought processes, though thia
guidance or control seems not to be brought about as Bain
1
 " Senses md Intelleot," 3rd Ed., p. 4SL • Loc. tit., p. 870.
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would have us believe, or in such a way as to justify the
language which he employs.
It must be borne in mind, in fact, that this voluntary mus-
cular activity itself occurs as a sequence of one of the links in
the association of ideas; and that the resulting control or
change in the direction of our thoughts is brought about by
the sensory results of the movements thus induced—that is,
by auditory or visual in concert with kinrosthetic impressions
reaching the brain, and again, according to their nature, and
by the ordinary laws of association, helping either to change
or maintain our previous line of thought.1
The Nature and Extent of Voluntary Power over the
Movements of our Bodies.
The occasions for the exercise of voluntary movements
of all kinds spring up, as I have pointed out, as ordinary links
in the chain formed by the association of our ideas.
Sometimes simple voluntary movements occur with all
the rapidity, ease, and lack of effort that characterize a so-
called ideoKmotor act, as when I resolve on certain occasions
to sit or stand; to jaise a glass of water to my lips when I
am thirsty ; or to eat when I am hungry. The initiatory
causes of such actions are only a very little more complicated
than those of simple spinal reflexes ; the principal difference
consisting, as Hartley long ago pointed out, in the fact that
instead of being started by an external impression, they are
initiated by ideas, although they may be more remotely
prompted by internal or external impressions.*
1
 The view of Prof. Bain concerning the direct intervention of muscles in.
the control of our thoughts, is of oourse Intimately dependent upon hia par-
tioolarview as to feelings of movement being in great part • concomitants of the
outgoing ourrent' and being realized in motor centres. This naturally implies
ideal recall in the same centres. Ferrier, strangely enough, though rejecting
Bain's views in these hitter respects, still adopts h i derivative doctrine as to
the scope of volition and the mode in which it effects oontrol over our thoughts
(" Functions of the Brain," 2nd Ed., p. 461). Kibot seems to show a IHTITI1*T»
inconsistency. He rejects Bain's notion concerning the mode of registration
of muscular sense impressions (" Attention," pp. 66 & 71) and yet adopts his.
derivative views concerning the mode in which our thoughts are directed
(loc. dt., p. 64).
* There is, in fact, no line of demarcation to be found between the
cersbral reflexes known as 'ideo-motor' acts, and simple or very f«n<Hai-
voluntary acts, ft is often impossible to say whioh is the more appropriate
designation for such acts- . In regard to ideo-motor actions Mailer said long
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At other times our voluntary actions only take place after
more or less complicated previous processes of deliberation,
or weighing of motives, and with much or little sense of
effort. As W. James says :*—" In the dentist's chair, one
idea is that of the manliness of enduring the pain, the other
is that of its intolerable character. We assent to the manli-
ness, saying ' let it be the reality,' and behold it becomes so,
though with a mental effort exactly proportionate to the sen-
sitiveness of our nerves. To the sailor on the wreck, one
idea is that of the sore. hands and the nameless aching
exhaustion of his whole frame which pumping involves.
The other is that of a hungry sea engulfing him. He says,
* rather the former,' and it becomes reality in spite of the
inhibiting influence of the comparatively luxurious sensations
of the spot in which he for the moment lies
But in other cases both alternatives are images of mixed
good and evil. Whatever is done has to be done against
some inhibitory agency, whether of intrinsic unpleasantness
in the doing, or of represented odiousness of the doing's
fruits ; the fiat has to occur against resistance. Volition then
comes hand in hand with the sentiment of effort
What does this effort seem to do ? To bring the decisive
• volition. What is this Volition ? The stable victory
of an idea although it may be disagreeable, the permanent
suppression of an idea although it may be immediately and
urgently pleasant."
At the same time that ideas and motives are in this way
in conflict, we have half-aroused or nascent images revived
in other sensory centres representing the alternative actions
or movements that would naturally be associated with this
or that motive were it allowed to be operative. But it is
only when one of these motives proves victorious—proves
Stronger, that is, than its rival—that all resistance is
removed; we consent to its supremacy, and the result is
ago, " The idea of a particular motion, determines a current of nervous action
towards the necessary muscles, and gives rise to the motion independently of
the will." At times we may have the production of actions generally regarded
as voluntary, taking place in this simple reflex fashion, and by aid of the
Bame nervous mechanisms. This is also pointed out by Wundt (toe. cit. 1.1.,
p. 443).
1
 " The Feeling of Effort," 1880, pp. 28 and 22.
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that the revived image of its associated action becomes the
immediate incitor of the real action which it foreshadowed.1
Thus it happens that, in order to bring about some
present or prospective ^pleasure, or the avoidance of some
present or prospective pain, we feel a desire to perform
certain definite movements, the ideas or images of such
movements being aroused, as James Mill originally pointed
out, as almost sub-conscious sensorial linka in the chain of
our thought processes.
From what has hitherto been said two important con-
clusions may be drawn. First, that a 'sense of effort' is
associated with the conflict of ideas and motives which
precedes the ascendancy of one of them; and that this sense
of effort must, therefore, be an appanage of the activity of
sensory centres and their annexes by the aid of which
intellectual processes are carried on. There is no good
reason for believing that the action of muscles has anything
to do with the generation of this particular ' sense of effort'.8
Secondly, that the 'act of willing' any particular move-
ment consists essentially in a consent (after the balancing of
reasons that may exist for or against) to the occurrence of
such a movement; the movement itself being at the time
mentally prefigured by certain revived sensations—such
revival representing, as James Mill said long ago, " the
last part of the mental operation." The occurrence or not
of the movement is to a certain extent an accident, and one
which, when it occurs, lies altogether outside the mental
process itself.
Let us look then now a little closer at these last linkfl in
the chain of association—that is at " the last part of the
1
 See Herbert Spencer, "Principles of Psychology," 1870, vol. I, p. 496.
1
 Another source of the sense of effort is intimately associated with the
Activity of our muscles. Its origin is to be found in the ingoing sensory
impressions of various kinds whose termini aud seats of registration are the
Mnmsthetio centres in each cerebral hemisphere. This is fully admitted by
Wundt, though not by Bain, to be one source of the ' sense of effort.' Some
confusion has, I think, lately been introduced into this already sufficiently
complex subject by Waller in a paper entitled "The Sense of Effort: an
Objeotdve Study" (Bums, 1891, pp. 179-249). This title seems to me
peculiarly unfortunate, in more ways than one. Interesting and carefully
worked out as many of the experiments are, they do not seem to me to touch
the question of the origin of the ' sense of effort' aa the term is understood
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mental operation " which leads on to the performance of a
voluntary movement. It consists in a revival of the idea or
conception of the movement to be executed. This idea has
always at least a two-fold basis, though the actual production
of the movement often requires a three-fold excitation of
Bensory centres in immediate succession, as I shall presently
show.
For limb and trunk movements the idea is composed of
revived visual and kinsesthetic impressions which have
previously been received during the execution of similar
movements. The reawakened activity of these sensory
centres affords the necessary stimulus and guidance for the
reproduction of the movement—the molecular actions asso-
ciated with their excitation evoke, that is, the related suit-
able activity of motor centres in the spinal cord. So that as
W. James puts it, "every representation of a motion awakens
the actual motion which is its object, unless inhibited by
some antagonistic representation simultaneously present to
the mind." The same kind of thing happens in regard to
speech movements, only here we have the reawakened
activity of auditory in conjunction with kineesthetic centres
by psychologists. I find therein no evidence to shake my opinions on this
•ubjeot, and, moreover, find modes of stating my views to which I cannot
assent. I hold that the functioning of muscle itself, of motor nerves, and of
motor oentres, are mere physiological processes devoid of subjective accom-
paniments; yet these are the structures in whioh Waller looks for after-effects
that he assumes to be " the same as or similar to, or parallel with, the
material substrata of the oonoomitant sensifloatory phenomena" (p. 193).
That is to say he seeks for the residual effects of what he says is variously
termed "sense of effort," •"muscular sense," " sense of movement," or " sense
of innervation," in points along the track ABM! of Fig. 1 (p. Sl),with the
whole of whioh, excepting one part, I say they have nothing directly to do.
He seems to think that I consider the peripheral changes in this track as of
mast importance; while, as matter of fact, I say that the peripheral ohanges
in muscle which he investigates, have nothing directly to do with any of theso
psychical phenomena. I hold that the contraction of muscles forms the
occasion merely for the birth of a series of ingoing impressions starting from
the peripheral ramifications of afferent nerves in muscles, joints, skin, &o.y
which are conveyed along the route MOA, and are consciously realized in
the centre A. He calls this latter an efferent or motor centre, and thinks the.
psyohioal events he names above are dependent mainly upon its molecular
activity. This is exaotly what I have long since said, with the important
exception, that I maintain the centre in question to be an afferent one (see p. SO).
I find in Waller's paper no new independent evidence of-any kind bearing
upon this latter problem;' and muoh in his mode of presenting the old
evidence to whioh I cannot assent. TTla paper, in my opinion, must be taken
solely as a contribution to what is known as " physiological fatigue "—as he,
in fact, would seem to indicate by his sub-title.
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starting the stimuli needful for calling into activity the
proper motor centres for speech kTthe bulb.
I would only add here that this view of James Mill1 is
also the doctrine taught as to the mode of production of
voluntary movements by Lotze8 and by Herbert Spencer ;*
that it has been advocated independently by W. James and
myself since 1880 ; and later by Munsterberg,4 Horsley8 and
others.
I have always considered that in the conjoint sensory
1
 Ante, p. 4.
1
 " Medioinische Psychologic," 1862.
1
 " Principles of Psychology," l i t ed., 1856, p. 618, and 2nd ed., 1870, vol. I.,
p. 496.
• Munaterberg's theory (see Mind, 1888, p. 468) concerning the 'muscular
sense ' and its relation to voluntary movements Is identically the same as that
published independently by Prof. James and myself in 1880, though this
seems not to have been recognised by Groom Robertson, since he speaks
(Mind, 1890, p. 626) of it " as mnHialHijg between the opposed theories that
have thus far occupied the ground." TM» attempt in the same place to claim
some justification for the view of Wundt and Bain seems to me not
very successful. Thus he says (p. 527) : " The difference on the afferent side
of the system between sensation and representative image is allowed to be one
that depends only or, at least, mainly, upon degree of exoitation : this being
(normally) greater when determined from the periphery. How, then, should
there not be a corresponding difference of representative and presentative
experience on the efferent side when the oerebral process in one case is not,
ana in the other is, effective in producing overt musoular contraction ? " My
answer to this is twofold7. In the first place, I say that the oentres to which
his query refers do not stand on the afferent side of the nervous system ; thqy
(».«., the kdnsesthetio centres) are the oortical termini for a definite olass of
impressions, and, like the visual and the auditory, are true afferent centres
(see p. 82). And, secondly, I would say that his analogical argument sets up
a claim for gubjeotive processes in association with the functioning of efferent
centres, whilst I, in oommon with James, Munsterberg and others, maintain
that no independent evidenoe exists to show that such functioning Is ever by
itself associated with a subjective phasis. TTia eyes are open to the possibility
of this latter retort. He sees, in faot, that his analogy would be rendered
nugatory by the denial of subjective phenomena in association with the func-
tioning of motor centres—but he omite to mention that this heresy is main-
tained by James and Munsterberg as well as by myself. I fail to see, moreover,
the cogency of his objections to the use of the term ' kineesthesis,' and its
derivatives. I would remind him that the term ' muscle sensation,' of whioh
he seems to approve as an alternative, refers to only one element entering
into the oomplexus of sensations produced in us whenever we make move-
ments ; and that the various components of this oomplexus are always
simultaneously subject to revival as guides for future movements. Surely, if
groups of impressions like this always occur together, and are always revived
together for the carrying out of important physiological processes, that is a
sufficient justification for speaking of them under some common name. And
if we bear in mind the fact that suoh impressions, like all others, are when
realised, as Oroom Robertson points ont, always " overlaid by representation,"
it may be seen that we are thereby enabled almost intuitively to interpret
them as manning movements of this or that part of our body. How could
we, then, better convey the desired meaning than by speaking of them as
'kjneesthetio' impressions?
* The Nineteenth Century, June, 1891, p. 867.
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revivals, or ' ideas of movement,' the visual or the auditory
impression, as the case may be, is the first to be revived, and
that the renewed activity in one or other of these centres is
passed on through associating fibres to functionally related
portions of the kinfflsthetic centres. The activity of these latter
centres seems to me to be almost if not always evoked in this
secondary manner, although for the actual production of the
suitable movements the functioning of the kinsesthetic
centres is all important. They are situated in the cortex at
what has been termed the " bend of the stream "—they are
indeed, the last portions of the cortex to be aroused in the
performance of voluntary movements, and from them actually
issue the fibres (viz., those of the pyramidal tract), which
convey the appropriate incitations to the real motor centres
situated in the bulb and in the spinal cord.1 Here then, as
elsewhere, motor centres produce (through the intermedia-
tion of nerves and muscles) movements which are qualified
as to nature, range, and force by the precise nature of the
stimuli which they receive from sensory centres.'
How all important these sensory activities are for the
production of voluntary movements iB well shown in many
cases of brain disease leading to speech defects. Thus, I
have had under observation from time to time since 1878 a
man who then became paralysed on the right side, and whose
powers of expression by speech and writing were at the same
1
 I purposely, for the sake of simplifying the problems under disoussion,
omit all reference here to the co-operative action of the cerebellum in the
actual production of movements.
• I am sorry that Dr. Ferrier has again not taken the trouble to state my
views correctly. In his most reoently published work he quite misrepresents
them by stating that I have taught that the kinesthetic centres are aroused
as " independent centres of activity, irrespective of the stimuli from the
sensory centres of the cortex" (" Cerebral Localisation," 1890, p. 147). This
supposed view of mine he then proceeds to refute by quoting the experiments
of Marique, confirmed by Exnor and Paneth, to the offeot that " when the
motor [kinmsthetlc] centres have been completely isolated, by section of the
fibres which associate them with the sensory centres of the cortex, paralysis
results o) precisely the same character as that which ocours when they are
completely extirpated. Marique proved that the same contractions were
obtainable an electrical irritation of the respective centres after, as before,
isolation, snowing that they still retained their excitability and connection
with the pyramidal tracts." So far from being opposed to my views, it will
be seen that these experimental results are in exact accordance with what I
have always said in regard to the mode in which the activity of the kiness-
thetlo oentres is evoked. See, for instance, " The Brain as an Organ of Mind,"
1880, p. 898, and elsewhere; also BEATS, Ap. 1887, pp. 7, 57, and elsewhere.
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time disordered in a remarkable manner.1 The principal
persistent defect in this man has been a damage to the
commissural or associating fibres connecting the visual and
the auditory word centres, so that he is unable to perform
any movements that require for their initiation and guidance
the successive conjoint activity of these centres : showmg
how absolutely dependent our thought processes are upon
the integrity of the associational paths. Thus, a blockage
occurred twelve years ago in the lines of communication
between the auditory and the visual centres; and as a
consequence this man cannot name objects at sight, or read
aloud words or even letters ; though he recognises them
perfectly, can read to himself with comprehension, and can
repeat names of things, or words of any kind, immediately
that he hears them. Again, though he has now learned to
write with the left hand, and he can without hesitation copy
in a rude way any words that are written on the paper before
him, he cannot write a single word spontaneously or from
dictation—not even a letter. The auditory stimulus will not
pass along the blocked track,' so that there is no means of
rousing the related portion of the visual centre or, con-
sequently, of the krneesthetic centre. Along this route
the idea of writing movements cannot be revived, and
as a result, the man cannot make even an attempt to form
a single letter. But his puzzled look and passive state
gives place to one of pleasure when he sees the word written,
and he immediately proceeds to copy i t ; just aB, in the pre-
vious trial, his eager tentative look at the word he seeks but
is unable to articulate, is followed, the instant he hears it
pronounced and thus receives an auditory revival, by its
correct utterance, A block in. the commissures connecting
the auditory with the related glosso-kinsBsthetic centre,
would similarly prevent reading or naming at sight, as it
would also prevent all spontaneous speech ; and a block
between the visual and the related cheiro-kinfiBsthetic centre
1
 His case is detailed in " The Brain as an Organ of Mind," p. 642.
* In silent thought, and therefore for spontaneous writing also, the first
memory of the word to be revived is, I believe, in the great majority of per-
sons, that which is registered in the auditory centre.
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would similarly render writing from dictation, or spontaneous
writing, impossible.1
Here, then, we get at the very roots of Will. The sources
of the power employed for arousing the appropriate contrac-
tions of our muscles is to be found in the molecular activi-
ties issuing from these sensory centres. This is shown by
the fact that we have in such cases as I have above referred
to, persons' willing' but unable to successfully execute certain
speech movements at the instigation of appropriate visual
impressions, though they retain the power of producing
such movements in response ^appropriate auditory stimuli ;
and, on the other hand, persons unable to produce writing
movements at the instigation of auditory stimuli, which
they are able at once to evoke at the bidding of visual im-
pressions.
The same kind of conclusion, as to the source of the
energy employed in the production of muscular movements
generally, has been forced upon Gotch and Horsley, during
their recent important electrical investigations concerning
the excitability of different regions in the brain and spinal
cord, which in 1890 formed the subject of the Croonian Lec-
ture before the Royal Society.' I note, however, that even
these investigators speak of the cerebral kinsesthetic centres
as being on the " efferent" side of the nervous system.*
This seems to me an erroneous interpretation. They are, I
think, afferent centres in every way analogous to the afferent
centres situated in the spinal cord.* The so-called " motor
centres " of the cortex were not, of course, originally supposed
to be termini for afferent impressions; when first discovered
they were said, and they are still maintained by Ferrier to be,
true " motor centres." Now, however, in spite of the different
interpretation which has been given of their functions, many
Btill cling to the belief that the centres in the Eolandic area
must be motor centres because internuncial fibres connect
them with the real motor centres in the bulb and spinal cord
—and because, therefore, ' motor incitations' must pass along
1
 See a paper "On Different THTifln of Aphasia," Brit. lied. Journ., Oct.
29th ana Nov. 8th, 1887.
» Phil. Trans. 1891, B, pp. 447, 449, 478 & 509.
• Loc. tit., p. 842.
* Loc ctf.,p. 479.
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such internnncial fibres.1 " "What initiates a motor process "
they say,* " i s to all intents and purposes motor." Or, as
Ferrier* puts it, " centres immediately concerned in effecting
voluntary movements " are " as such motor." Both these
PIG. l . Fio. 2.
FIG. 1.—Diagram illustrating the origin of kintesthetio impressions (so far
as they come from muscle) andtheir relation to the ^reduction of voluntary
movements, in accordance with my views.
A. Cerebral afferent (kinjesthetio) centre, receiving and registering ingoing
impressions from muscle by way of an afferent spinal centre 0 ; i.f. i.f., two Bete
of internuncial fibres; B, spinal efferent or motor oentre, which receives incita-
tions from A, whence they are sent on to the muscle M.
.-. A is an afferent oentre in the same sense that 0 is an afferent centre
and each of them may initiate ' motor incitations' which pass along inter-
nuncial fibres to the motor centre B.
Flo. 8.—Diagram illustrating the origin of muscular sense impressions
and their relation to the production of voluntary movements, in accordance
•with the views of Dr. Femer.
A. Cerebral afferent (tactile) oentre receiving and registering ingoing Im-
pressions from muscle by way of an afferent spinal centre C; A' a supposed
motor centre, which operates through commissural fibres upon the spinal
motor centre B.
.-. No psychical processes are believed by either of us to be associated with
the functional activity of the tracks represented by unbroken lines and the
centres lying in their course.
I say that the functions attributed by Ferrier to A' are really performed by
A as in Fig. 1, and that if A,A' existed as in Fig. S, there ought to be two sets
of excitable areas in each hemisphere.
1
 Since 18801 have always restricted the term ' internuncial' to fibres which
connect an afferent with an efferent centre ; employing the term .'.commissnral'
to those fibres that connect two afferent or two efferent oentres with one
another. (See '.' Brain as an Organ of Mind," p. 686).
« W. L. Mackenzie, in Blunt, 1887, p. 438.
• "Functions of the Brain," 2nd Ed., p. 848.
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statements I believe to be altogether erroneous. As I have
said elsewhere,1 " The plan on which nervous centres
generally are constructed, of whatsoever grade, makes it
essential that the stimulus which awakens the activity of a-
' motor ' ganglion or centre shall come to it through connect-
ing fibres from a ' sensory' ganglion centre, or knot of cells
—that is, from cells which stand in immediate relation with
ingoing fibres." Thus, we should not call a cortical centre
for afferent impressions ' motor,' any more than we should
call the group of ganglion cells on the afferent side of a.
spinal reflex arc ' motor.' In each case the nerve cells that
receive the afferent impulses are in association with channels
which convey ' motor incitations'; and in each case the
stimulation of such intemuncial fibres or of the centres from
which they proceed would give birth to definite movements.
The course of these intemuncial fibres is for the most part
horizontal in the spinal cord, though more rarely it may be
an ascending one. But from the kineesthetic centres in the
brain the course of the intemuncial fibres is downwards (in
the pyramidal tract) ; hence the current is commonly spoken
of, truly enough, as an " out-going current "; but with the
effect, apparently, of fostering some confusion in the minds
of not a few persons. It was apparently under the influence
of some such confusion that W. L. Mackenzie,8 a writer
above quoted, penned the following sentences. If " we con-
fine consciousness to sensory processes, then since sensory
may excite motor processes, we must imagine conscious-
ness suddenly ceasing on the nervous bridge—the inter-
nuncial fibres—between a sensory and a motor centre.
If this be so the tima has come for abolishing altogether the
distinction of sensory and motor cortical centres ; they are
all sensori-motor." This seems to me to be an invalid con-
clusion, based upon a misconception as to the mode in which
motor centres generally are stimulated. Certainly, there is
no more reason why centres on the afferent side of the
nervous system which happen to be situated in the cortex
should be called ' sensori-motor,' than that such a term
1
 "The Brain as an Organ of Mind," p. 685.1
 Loc. dt., p. 482.
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should be applied to similar afferent centres situated in the
spinal cord. And yet it would be only upon such a basis
that justification could be found for the oft-quoted view of
Hughlings Jackson, cited by the same author (loc. cit., p.
432) " that the physiological substratum of every mental
process is a sensori-motor process."
From what has now been set forth, as well as from the
facts and arguments detailed in a previous communication
to this Society,1 it seems to me quite clear that there is no
reason for postulating the existence of cortical motor centres
for the production of voluntary movements ; that whatever
the mode in which simple movements are produced, that is,
whether they are voluntary or reflex, only one set of motor
centres is called into play, and that these motor centres are
situated in the bulb and in the spinal cord; and, further,
that the functioning of motor centres generally is attended
by no psychical accompaniments. In reference to this last
point I have said elsewhere :3—" No ideal reproductions,
seem ever to take place in such centres; they are roused
into activity by outgoing currents, and, so far as we have
any evidence, the induction in them of molecular movements
which, immediately afterwards, issue through cranial and
spinal motor nerves to muscles are simply physical
phenomena. These processes are apparently as free from
subjective accompaniments as are the actual molecular
processes thereby incited in the muscle itself." In fact the
molecular motions that occur in motor centres " seem to lie
even more truly outside the sphere of Mind than the
molecular processes comprised in the actual contraction
of a muscle; these latter are at least immediately followed
by ' ingoing' impressions, whilst so far as we know—that is
so far as any evidence exists—the former are not."
On the other hand, in common with James, and in part
with Miinsterberg and others, I maintain, that all the sensa-
tions resulting from movement are derived from ingoing
1
 "The 'Muscular Sense;' its Nature and Cortical Localisation," BRAIN,.
April, 1887.
3
 " The Brain as an Organ of Mind," p. 699. The lack of sensibility ac-
companying the action of motor centres has now been experimentally
demonstrated by Qotch and Horsley (loc. cit. p. 610).
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impressions;, that such sensations are realized and revivable
in idea in special sensory centres in the Rolandic
area of the cortex, which are in intimate associational
relation with visual, auditory, and other sensory centres;
that the functional activity assumed to be performed
by voluntary motor centres in the Eolandic area is really
carried out by these sensory centres of kinfflsthetic type,
similarly located; so that in " the association of ideas"
generally, as well as in the processes of Attention and
Volition we have merely to do with the psychical activity of
sensory centres and their annexes—and not of motor and
sensory centres, with the-former often dominating. Thus I
hold that the process of Attention is in its essence sensory,
though with inseparable motor accompaniments; while
Volition, so far from " existing only in connection with the
active organs, that is, with the muscular system,"1 seems to
represent merely some phases in the " association of ideas "
and, as W. James puts it, is rather " a psychic or moral
fact pure and simple, and is absolutely completed when the
intention or consent is there "—he also maintaining that the
supervention of motion upon its completion is a super-
numerary phenomenon belonging to the department of
physiology. The phenomena of Volition are, therefore, not
the work of any special faculty or mysteriouB entity, nor are
they carried on in motor centres; they are merely certain
exemplifications of intellect in action; so that ample justifi-
cation is found for the dictum of Spinoza, " Voluntas et
intellectus unum et idem aunt." Anything separate to be
known as "Will, is, in fact, a mere phantom—>a kind of
psychological ghost.
1
 B*in, " The Senses and the Intellect," 8r& Ed., p. SfiO.
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